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PRELIMINARY MEHORANDUH

j)..t~. ~ 1~7tf

SUFflffie r li s t 15 , Sh e e t: -1No. 77-1665-CFY

Cert to CA 9 (Merrill,
Cummings, Sneed; memo)

Bonanno (fed . pris)

v.
United States
SU~~RY:

Federal/Criminal

Timely

Petr contends that he is entitled to relief under

§

2255

from the Board of Parole's denial of parole, which petr and the DC

(~ckham) say frustrated the DC's intentions in sentencing petr.
FACTS:

Petr was sentenced to 5 years on each of four counts, the

sentences to run concurrently. sentence was imposed under what is now
18 U.S.C. § 4205(b) (2) (1976)

[that portion of Title 18 was recodified

by the Parole Comm'n & Reorganization Act of 1976; this memo gives
the current section numbers, the original section was 4208(a) (2)].
That section is one of three available to DJs ,

Under § 4205(a) the

DJ imposes a definite sentence and the prisoner is eligible for parol e
after serving one third of his sentence or ten years.

(

Under § 4205(b)

(1) (1976) the DJ imposes both a minimum and a maximum sentence; the
prisoner is eligible for parole at any time after serving the minimum
and less than one third of the maximum.

Under§ 4205(b) (2) the DJ
"""IDI,TI '-Y
sets only the maximum sentence; the prisoner is~eligible for parole

at the discretion of the Board of Parole.
under the latter section.

Petr's sentence was

impo ~. ed

Petr now argues that the DJ's expectation

was that he would be paroled if he showed satisfactory adaptation to
prison life.
Petr began serving his sentence in Aug 1972.

In Nov 1973 the Bd

of Parole published its new guidlines, 38 Fed Reg 31942 [28 CFR § 2.2 0
which did not treat sentencing under § 4205(b) (2) as significant.
The Bd refused to recommend parole in ,Jan 1975, after having denied an

c

earlier hearing in Nov 1974.

After petr served one third of his

sentence the Bd again denied parole.

Petr then filed this

§

2255

action in DC, claiming that he had been denied due process by the
I

I

increased severity of his

senten ~

The DC agreed that the Bd's acti o

thwarted his intentions; so, the DC vacated the original sentence,
resentenced petr to four, concurrent five-year sentences, suspended t h
~

sentences and imposed a probation term of five years.

v

HOLDING BELOW: CA 9 reversed, holding that the DC had no jurisdiction under § 2255 to modify the sentence.

The CA relied upon its

previous decision in Andrino v. United States, 550 F.2d 519 (1977),
in which it had held that habeas corpus was the proper procedure for
obtaining judicial review of the parole board's decision.
CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the DJ had misapprehended the

implications of the sentence for later parole.

According to petr ther

was a general understanding that by sentencing under§ 4205(b) (2)

the

DJ would ensure that the parole board considered only the prisoner's
conduct while in prison.

In particular, the DJ thought that the Bd

would not take into account the type of illegal act and the prisoner's
prior record.

When the Bd introduced its salient factors for deter-

mining eligibility for parole it included the very considerations which
the DJ had assumed would be excluded.

Petr

~ontends

that that inclu-

sion of additional factors thwarted the DJ's intent, thereby dening
petr due process.
Petr also contends that there is a conflict among the circuits.
The 9th Cir is aligned with the 1st in holding that section 2255 cannot
be used to challenge the Bd's action. See United States v
560 F.2d 7 (CA 1 1977).

McBride,

Opposing those cases are the 3rd and 8th Cirs .

t~·,

See-pnited States v. Salerno, 53S F.2d 1005 (CA3 1976); Kortness v.
---,~

United States, 514 F.2d 167 (CAS 1975).
SG does not oppose cert, but suggests that the better course would
be to hold this case pending disposition of two others v1hich pose
similar issues.

United States v. Addonizio, 573 F.2d 147 (CA3 1978)

(Aldisert, Hunter; Cahn, DJ), cert applied for, docket no. 28-156,
involved a sentence under § 4205(a).

The DJ found that his intentions

had been frustrated by the Bd's actions.
its decision in Salerno.
1978)

The CA affirmed, based upon

United States v. Edwards, 574 F.2d 937 (CAS

(Bright; Henley, concur; Stephenson, dissent), cert applied for,

docket no 78-157, involved a sentence under§ 4205(b) (2).

The DJ

found that the Bd's actions had not frustrated his intentions.

Never-

theless, the CA reversed, saying that the Bd had not given meaningful
consideration to the prisoner's application for parole.

Without meanin

ful consideration, the DJ's intentions could not have been followed.
SG suggests that in Addonizio and Edwards the Court is confronted

with the full diversity of issues that arise because of the Bd's
policies with respect to parole.

As a result, the SG does not

think that a grant of cert is warranted in a third case involving
the same issues.

SG does not discuss the question of the propriety

of § 2255 for making this challenge.
DISCUSSION:

With the split among the circuits there is need for

this Court to resolve the question of whether a sentence may be
revised in response to a decision of the parole board.

~

In spite of

the SG's description, this case presents the additional question of
. the propriety of the use of § 2255 as opposed to habeas corpus.

With

7

the CA's decision in this case there is now an additional S?lit over

---------=-

the procedural route to follow in reviewing the parole board's ac ion.

----------------------------------------------------~

Since there are at least three similar cases before the Court, they
should be discussed together; and, possibly , the Legal Office should
be asked to review these and any other similar cases to

deter~ine

which

should be argued orally.
There is a response.

8/21/78
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SUMMARY: The SG seeks review of a decision

o t:r-"~~ .
~

holding that, on a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C o
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-2FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: FederaL trial courts may rely

--

on three different statutory provisions in sentencing an
offender, each having different implications for parole.
The judge may impose a straight sentence, with eligibility
for parole after service of one-third of the sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 4205(a). Alternatively, .the judge may impose an
indeterminate sentence with minimum and maximum period of
confinement specified. Id. § 4205(b)(l).

Finally, the judge

may impose an indeterminate sentence with no minimum and only
a maximum period of confinement specified. Id. § 4205(b)(2).
Once a prisoner is eligible for parole, the Parole Commission
has broad discretion in deciding whether to release the prisoner. Id. § 4206(a).
The prisoners in this case, described more ntlly below,
were sentenced under the first provision, § 4205(a). Prior
to 1973, trial courts apparently assumed that prisoners
sentenced under this provision would be released upon completion
of one-third of the sentence, given a good institutional record
and no finding of probable recidivism. After 1973, however,
the Commission began relying on published guidelines in making
parole decisions. These guidelines focussed not only on insti-

I tutional behavior and

the liklihood of recidivism, but also

on the nature of the crime the prisoner had committed. In 1976,
Congress passed the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act,
amending § 4206(a) to make it explicit that the Commission
should consider whether release on parole would "depreciate
the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for
the law."

:;

.
This case involves three district court decisions consolidated

-3-

together on appeal.
/

The first case,

United States v. Addonizio, involved

../'

the former Mayor of Newark, New Jersey, who had been convicted
of conspiracy and extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1951, and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and
a $25,000 fine. Resp. Addonizio became
eligible for parole
.
on July 3, 1975, after serving on-third of

hi~

sentence. How-

ever, although Addonizio had been a model prisoner and was
considered to present no danger of recidivism, he was not
released on parole. The Commission explained that Addonizio's
crimes had demonstrated such a breach of public trust that
to release him would depreciate the seriousness of his offenses
and promote disrespect for the law.
Addonizio then filed this motion for resentencing pursuant

L

to 28 U.S.C.

§

2255. The DC (Barlow) expressly stated that, in sentencing

Addonizio, he had anticipated that, with good behavior, Addonizio would
remain in prison only 3 1/2 to 4 years. The judge had considered this the appropriate length of confinement given the severity of
Addonizio's offenses. Under the law of the CA 3, the DC found
that he had jurisdiction to consider Addonizio's grievance
under § 2255. Accordingly, the court reduced the sentence to
time served.
The second and third cases

involved resps. Whelan, the

former Mayor, and Flaherty, a former city councilman, of Jersey
City, New Jersey. They too had been convicted of conspiracy
and extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, and had been
sentenced by DJ Shaw to 15 years imprisonment. They became eligible for parole in 1976 after serving one-third of their
sentences. However, the Commission refused to release Whelan
and Flaherty on parole, explaining that their offenses were

-4-

part of large-scale organized criminal activity and involved
~

a breach of the public trust.
Whelan and Flaherty then filed two suits challenging their
confinement. The first, a motion for relief under § 2255,
was assigned to Judge Biunno, Judge Shaw having died. Resps.
argued that the denial of parole had frustrated Judge Shaw's
expectations, and thus that their sentences should be reduced.
The DC found that he had no jurisdiction to consider this
claim under § 2255, the proper avenue of relief being general
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. United States v. Salerno, 538 F.2d 1005
as a
(CA 3 1976), upholding such jurisdiction under§ 2255,was distinguished/
case where the denial of parole violated the explicit statements of the sentencing judge. Even if jurisdiction
was available under § 2255, the DC would deny the relief sought,
since the "spectacle of Whelan and Flaherty being paroled and
free to escape with their ill-gotten gains" was "revolting."
The second suit was a § 2241 petition filed in the district
of confinemento The DC (Muir) found that the proper mode of
relief was a § 2255 motion, and since Judge Biunno's decision
was likely to be reversed on appeal, the DC declined to address
the frustration of expectations argument. Turning to the
question whether the denial of probation was arbitrary and capricious under § 2241, the DC held that in light of the nature of Whelan's
and Flaherty's crimes it was not.
TheCA affirmed Addonizio, vacated and remanded Whelan's
~

and Flaherty's § 2255 action, and affirmed Whelan's and Flaherty's
§

2241 action. The court reaffirmed the holding of Salerno, supra,

and United States v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108 (CA 3 1977), that "the
intent and expectation of the district court judge who sentences

-5-

under [§ 4205(a)] ••• are controlling and ••• must be searched
out to detennine if relief may be ordered under 28

u.s.c.

§ 2255." The court ruled that Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, which authorizes

a sentencing judge to reduce a sentence within 120 days after
sentence or final unsuccessful appeal, was not the exclusive
avenue for sentence reduction, but merely an alternative to
the § 2255 route.

Speaking in rather broad, jurisprudential

terms, the court stated that its decision was grounded in the
''moral" principle that "a sentencing judge's intent and probable
expectations should be vindicated to the fullest extent possible."
Accordingly, where a prisoner is required to serve an appreciably
longer term of imprisonment because subsequently adopted parole
guidelines effect a provable frustration of the intentions and
expectations of the trial court, "regard for the integrity of
'-

the sentencing court, as well as concepts of decency and fair
play, dicatate that that court should be in a position to
vindicate those original intentions and expectations."

Petn 9a.

Turning to the Addonizio case, the court found that the
Commission's consideration of the nature and circumstances of
the offense, after the sentencing judge had considered these
factors in setting the maximum punishment, amounted in effect

7

to double punishment. "Society cannot have it both ways; it
cannot expose one to a harsh maximum ••• and then, years later,
for precisely the same reason which caused the harsh maximmn
to be imposed, impose a doubly harsh minimum."
Despite the potentially broad

implicati~n

Petn. 18a.

of the "frustration

of expectations" theory, the court observed in a footnote that
rule of the CA 3 was confined to cases where the sentencing had
occured prior to an unforeseen change in Parole Commission policy.
Petn. 18a. n. 10.

-6-

With respect to Whelan's and Flahe·r ty' s appeals, the
~

court remanded Judge Biunno's denial of their § 2255 petition for
reconsideration in light of the Addonizio ruling. The court found
that Judge Muir had stated the correct standard of review
under § 2241, and could see no basis to upset the application
of that standard to the facts.
CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that the circuits are deeply
divided over the extent to which sentencing courts may revise

-::...---

sentences in response to parole decisions. The CA 3, in the
present case, appears to have adopted the view that a sentencing
court can vindicate its expectations whenever the Commission
alters the standards under which it exercises discretion. The
CA 8, in Edwards v. United States, 574 F.2d 937 (1978),

~·

pending, No. 78-157, has taken the view that courts may revise
sentences imposed before 1973 under§ 4205(b)(2), which makes
the offender immediately eligible for parole. The CA 1, CA 2,
CA 6, CA 7, and CA 9 have held that setencing courts have no
authority to revise lawful sentences in response to parole
decisions. These courts hold that it makes no difference that
the sentence was imposed before a change in Commission policy,
or that the judge's sentencing expectations were frustrated.
See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 560 F.2d 7 (CA 1 1977).
On the merits, the SG argues that the CA 3's position
is grounded in three erroneous legal and factual assumptions.
First, the court erred in assuming that sentencing expectations may be vindicated on a §- 2255 motion. This section

~equires

a claim that the sentence was in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or that the sentencing court was
without jurisdiction, or that the sentence was in excess of

-7the maximum authorized by law, or that the sentence "is other,.-

wise subject to collateral attack." The "subject to collateral
attack" provision is not a carch-all that authorizes courts
to do whatever they believe is required in the interests of
justice. "[T]he appropriate inquiry [is] whether the claimed
error of law [is] 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974). The SG maintains that the
denial of parole

in these cases did not amount to a "complete

miscarriage of justice." Moreover, the SG repeats the argument made below that Fed. R. Crim P. 35 provides the only
basis by which a sentencing court can reduce an otherwise
lawful sentence.
Second, the SG maintains that the CA erred in assuming

<-

that it is properly' within province of the sentencing court
to have "expectations" about how the Commission will exercise
its discretion within the limits established by the sentence.
The SG points out that sentencing authority is divided between

-

the three branches of the Government: the Legislature fixes the
ranges within which sentence may be imposed; the Judiciary
imposes sentence in each case, selecting a maximum and miaimum
punishment within the range authorized by Congress; and the
Executive, acting through the Parole

Co~~ission,

determines

the exact date a£ release. As the CA 1 put it, permitting
a district court to revise a sentence whenever the Parole
Commission's decision is inconsistent with the court's intent
"divest[s] the Commission of its discretionary power under the
law, and defeat[s] the objectives of placing the parole decision
in a separate body." United States v. DiRusso, 548 F.2d 372,

-8-

375 (1976).
Finally, the SG presents statistics purporting to show
that the CA erred in assuming that prior to 1973 the Commission
paid little or no attention to the gravity of the offense in
determining whether to release prisoners on parole. Figures
derived by the Commission from computer coded information reveal
that in 1970, the year Addonizio was sentenced, of persons
with no prison disciplinary infractions, 21.8% were released
after one-third of their sentences, 16.7% were released sometime
after the one-third point, and 61.5% were held until mandatory
release. If the sample is confined to first offenders, 42.2%
were released at one-third, 27.9% were released after onethird, and 29.9% were held until mandatory release. According

r

to the SG, these figures indicate that,if the courts below
had an "expectation" that prisoners with good institutional
records and little danger of recidivism were invariably paroled
at one-third of their sentence, they were mistaken.
Resp. Addonizio concedes that there is a conflict among
the circuits. However, he argues that the rule of the CA 3
is confined to the circumstances created by the new parole
guidelines, and as such the rule will effect an ever decreasing
number of inmates. The impact of the decision below is therefore narrow and does not warrant this Court's attention. In
addition, resp. notes that, because this Court reinstated the
order of the DC releasing Addonizio after it · was stayed by
theCA, 431 U.S. 909 (1977), he has been out of prison since

(~

May 12, 1977. Under the circumstances, it would be "unjust and
unreasonable" to subject him again to uncertainty about his
future.

-9-

DISCUSSION: This petn. should be considered together
with United States v. Edwards,

No~

78-157, and Bonanno v.

United States, No. 77-1665. The circuits are split over

I

the general question whether a sentencing court may vindicate

its sentencing expectations after a change in Parole Commission
policy (Addonizio); over whether .sentencing review is available in § 4205(b)(2) cases, if not § 4205(a) and § 4205(b)(l)
cases (Edwards); and over whether sentencing expectations can
be vindicated in § 2241 proceedings, if not § 2255 proceedings
(Bonanno).
The present case appears . to present an important issue
concerning the appropriate allocation of responsibility in
the federal system of sentencing and parole. Resp.'s suggestion
that the impact of the decision below will be quite limited
should be greeted with scepticism in light of the experience
of the CA 8, which was inundated with "a flood of pro se § 2255
motions" after a similar decision. Jacobson v. United States,
542 F.2d 725, 727 (1976). Moreover, as the SG notes, the
Commission's guidelines are subject to periodic study and re)

v~sio~,

and under the rationale of the CA 3, every future modifica-

t~on ~n

the guidelines would lead to a new wave of collateral

attacks on parole decisions o
Grant. There is a response from resp. Addonizio.
9/13/78

Merrill

DC, CA ops. in

petn.
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-156, United States v. Addonizio
The SG has filed a Second Supplemental Memorandum

in the case.

In it, he calls the attention of the Court to a

recent decision of the CA 8,

~

bane.

In that case, the CA 8

adhered to its position that courts may reduce sentences in
response to changes in Parole Comm'n policies.

But the CA 8

limited this~uthority to reduce sentences to cases in which
defendants had been sentenced prior to the adoption of the
Parole Comm'n's guidelines, under 18 U.S.C. §4205(b)(2) (maximum
but no minimum sentence).
The SG reads this decision as an overruling of the
CA 8

decison in United States v. Edwards, petn for cert.
Edwards, the court held that a sentence imposed
U.S.C. §4205(b)(l) (min1(mum sentence set by sentencing

judge at less than one-third of maximum sentence) must be
reduced if changes in Parole Comm'n policy frustrate the
sentencing court's
in No. 78-157.

2.

The SG points out that the resps in the present case
were sentenced under 18

u.s.c.

§4205(a) (sentencing judge sets

maximum sentence, and defendant is eligible for parole only
after serving one-third of the sentence, or ten years of a
sentence greater than 30 years).

He points out that the

decision of the CA 3 that such sentences could be reduced
on account of subsequent changes in Parole Comm'n policy
is in conflict with the recent en bane decision of the CA 8.
The SG also comments that if this case is granted
along with Bonnano, No. 77-1665, the cases could be
consolidated and argued in a single hour.

Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned ...... . ........... , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No. 78-156

UNITED STATES
vs.

ADDONIZIO
Rellsted. (Note response requested in No.
dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 60.)

HOLD

FOR

CERT.
G

D

Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ................ ~ ........ .
Stewart, J ....................... .
White, J ........................ .
Marshall, J ...................... .
Blackmun, J ......................... .
Powell, J............... . . . . . . -./'
. . . ..
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . .
Stevens, J ............. .

.V ...... ..

/8 157

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN 'Jc
N

POST

DIS

AFF

MERITS
REV

AFF

however Sol. Gen. to

December 8, 1978
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 .. .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.77-1665

BONANNO
vs.

UNITED STATES
Relisted.

..

HOLD

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT

CERT.

FOR

G

N

D

POST

DIS

MERITS

AFF

REV

AFF

MOTION
G

ABSEN'l'

NOT VOTING

D

Burger, Ch. J ................... .

~ ... .

Brennan, J .....................
Stewart, J .....................

V;. ...
·~' · ..

White, J ......................

Marshall, J ....................... ~· ..

V'

Blackmun, J ...................... f ..
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......

.

~' · ..

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... /

... .
Stevens, J ........................... .
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

••

0

0

0.

0

•••

0

0

• • • • •

0

••

0

0

•••

0

••••••

0

•

••••••••

0.

0

••

0

•••

0.

0

0.

0.

0

•••••••••

!o: The Chief Juetioe
Jbt. Justice Brennan
11r. Justice Stewart

lr.
Ur.
Mr.
lr.

Just1oe
Justioe
Justice
Justice
Mr. Justice

White
Marshall
Blaokmun
Powell
Rebnquist

from: Mr. Justice Stevens
C1roulated: __~III~
· -2___2_1S
_____..

1st DRAFT

Recirculated~------

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'l'ATES
No. 78-156

I

United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the United ~
v.
States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
Hugh J. Addonizio et al.
{May -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change
in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has
prolonged their actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the sentencing judge. The question presented is
whether this type of allegation will support a collateral attack
on the original sentence under 18 U. S. C. § 2255. 1 We hold
that it will not.
I
With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before
28 U. S. C. § 2255 provides:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, oris otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
1

"If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction,
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open
to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisonPr as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment. aside
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate."·

~

t/1/

~

~

---

78-156-0PINION

2

UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO

us are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we
accept for purposes of decision Addonizio's view of the facts
and the relevant aspects of the Parole Commission's practices.
After his conviction in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, on September 22, 1970,
Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine
of $25,000. Factors which led the District Judge to impose
that sentence included the serious character of Addonizio's
offenses/ and the Judge's expectation that exemplary institu2 At the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated:
"Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio's record of public service] ... is his conviction by a jury in this court of crimes of monumental
proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely be exaggerated and the
commission of which create the gravest implications for our form of
government.
"Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been convicted of
one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive counts of extorting
hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons doing business with the City
of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of this magnitude, I suggest to you,
Mr. HeUring [defense counsell, could have never succeeded without the
then-Mayor Addonizio's approval and participation.
"These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for which
Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted represent a
pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic criminal extortion over
a period of many years, claiming many victims and touching many more
lives.
"Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed governmental officials are certainty not novel to the law, but the corruption disclosed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by the frightening
alliance of criminal elements and public officials, and it is this very kind
of totally destructive conspiracy that was conceived, organized and executed by these defendants.
" . . . It is impossible to estimate the impact upon-and the cost of-these
criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark, and, indeed, to the citizens
of the State of New Jersey, in terms of their frustration, despair and
disillusionment.

"Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very heart of
our civili~ed form of government and of our society. The people will not
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tional behavior would lead to Addonizio's release when hE}
became eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.8 The judge did not contemplate that the Parole Com.,.
mission might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reasoR
for refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive.
In 1973 the Parole Commission markedly changed its
policies. 4 Under its new practices the seriousness of the
offense became a significant factor in determining whether a
prisoner should be granted parole. Addonizio became eligible
for parole on July 3, 1975. After hearings, the Parole Comtolerate such conduct at any level of government, and those who use thei.t
public office to betray the public trust in this manner can expect from the
courts only the gravest consequences.

"It is, accordingly, the sentences of this Court that the defendant Hugh
J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General
of the United States for a term of ten years, and that, additionally, the
defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a fine of $25,000. That is all."
573 F. 2d, at 154.
8 In his opinion granting Addonizio relief under § 2255 in 1977, Judge
Barlow stated:
"At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that petition~r
would receive a meaningful parole hearing-that is, a determination based
on his institutional record and the likelihood of recidivism-upon the completion of one-third (VJ) of his sentence. The Court anticipated-assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined-that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approximately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence, in view of
the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to be little
probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the case and his personal and social history. This sentencing expectation was based on the
Court's understanding-which was consistent with generally-held notionsof the operation of the parole system in 1970." Pet. for Cert. 28a-29a.
4 The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in 1972
and started to apply them throughout the nation in November 1973. See
38 Fed. Reg. 31942. The Commission's present guidelines are codified at
·28 CFR § 2.20. The use of guidelines is now required by statute. See
18 U. S. C. §§ 4203 (a) (1) and 4206 (a).
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mission twice refused to release 'him, expressly basing its
refusal on the serious character of his crimes. 5
Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing.
Following the Third Circuit's decision in United States v.
Salerno, 538 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court accepted jurisdiction, found that the Parole Commission had
not given Addonizio the kind of "meaningful parole hearing"
that the judge had anticipated when sentence was imposed,
and reduced his sentence to the time already served. The
judge stated that he had "anticipated-assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined-that ·[Addonizio] would be actually confined for a
As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit, the comments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977, explaining
its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the reasons given by the trial
judge at the time sentence was imposed. The Commission stated:
"Your offenBe behavior has been rated as very high severity. Your silent
factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total of 57 months at time
of hearing. Guidelines established by the Commission for adult cases
which consider the above factors suggest a range of 25-36 months to be
served before release for cases with good institutional adjustment. After
careful consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, a
decision above the guidelines appears warranted because your offense was
part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which
consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and approximately
14 other co-conspirators. As the highest elected official in the City of
Newark, you were convicted of an extortion conspiracy in which, under
color of your official authority, you and your co-conspirators conspired to
delay, impede, obstruct, and otherwise thwart construction in the City
ef Newark in order to obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of
working on city construction projects.
"Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted totalling approximately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent citizens of Newark, and
because the offense involved a serious breach of public trust over a substantial period of time, a decision above the guidelines is warranted.
Parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and
promote disrespect for the law."· 573 F . 2d, at 153-154 .
5

..•.
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period of approximately three and one-half to four years of
the ten-year sentence." This "sentencing expectation'• wrus
frustrated by the Parole Commission's subsequent adoptil))n of
new standards and procedures.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F. 2d 147. Because
of a conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding
that § 2255 does not give district courts this type of resentencing authority, 6 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari in Addonizio's case and in the consolidated case of
two other prisoners in which similar relief was granted. 7
II
We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider
the Government's alternative argument that the significance
of the changes in the Parole Commission's procedures has been
exaggerated because it always attached some weight to the
character of the offense in processing parole applications.
Nor do we have any occasion to consider whether the new
guidelines are consistent with the Parole Commission and
6 Bonanno v. United States, Civ. No.- (CA9 1978), cert. granted,U. S. (Dec. 11, 1978), cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60, U. S.
(Feb. 1, 1979).
7 In United States v. Whelan & Flaherty, two federal prisoners filed
motions under §§ 2241 and 2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241
motion was denied by the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed,
573 F. 2d 147, and Whelan and Flaherty did not seek further review. In
the § 2255 motion, which is at issue here, the respondents claimed that
the Parole Commission's action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who
had originally sentenced them and who had since died . The case was
assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that "the real issue is
whether the Parole Commission's denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious," Pet. App., at 35a, and concluded that it was not . The Court of
Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to reconsider the
case to determine whether Judge Shaw's sentencing intent had been frustrated. Proceedings on remand have resulted in the release of both
respondents.
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Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219; 8 or whether their
enforcement may violate the Ex Post Factor Clause of the
Clause of the Constitution. 9

III
When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the procedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment
entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to
modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral review. It has, of course, long been settled law that
an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. 1 ()
The reasons for na.rrowly limiting the grounds for collateral
attack on final judgments a.re well known and basic to our
adversary system of justice. 11 · The question in this case is
whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental
to come within those narrow limits.
Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it "was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
See Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3
1978).
0 See Rodriguez v. United States Parole Commission and Metropolitan
Center, slip op. No. 78-2051 (CA7 Mar. 20, 1979) .
10 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 ("Of
course the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal. .. .
This rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be
maintained."); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 181-182; Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424.
11 Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the
intE.'grity of our procedures. See, e. g., Bator, Finality In Cnminal Law
And Federal Habeas Coqms For State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441,
451-453 (1963). Moreover, increased volume of judicial work associated
with the procE'SSing of collateral attacks inevitably impairl:l and delay;; the
orderly administration of justice. BecausE' there is no limit on the time
when a colJatNal attack may be made, evidentiary hearing;; are often inconclusive and retrials may be impossible if the a.t tack is :succr;;:sful. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 491 n. 31; Henderson v. Kibbe, 4:31 U. S.
145, 154 n. 13.
8
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sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." This statute was
intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions
filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by
providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 216--217.
While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does
not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.
·Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions
and sentences entered by a court without jurisdiction. See,
e. g., Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-203 (MARSHALL, C.
J.). In later years, the availability of the writ was expanded
to encompass claims of constitutional error as well. See
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104-105; Brown v. Allen,
344 U. S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack
has remained far more limited. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.
465, 477 n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law
does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed
error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428.
Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of
fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255
proceeding, as amicus here points out/~ is that traditionally
they could have been raised by a petition for a writ of coram
nobis, and thus fall within §2255's provision for vacating sentences that are "otherwise subject to collateral attack. " But
coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors of
.fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing "in those
cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular
and invalid." United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69.
12

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lewisburg Prison Project, at 10-12.
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Thus, the writ of coram nobis was "available to bring before
the court that pronounced the judgment errors in matters
of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and
were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under age, appeared by an attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a
married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or dies
before verdict of interlocutory judgment." Id., at 68.
The claimed error here-that the judge was incorrect in
his assumptions about the future course of parole proceedings-does not meet any of the established standards of
collateral attack. There is no claim of a constitutional violation; the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits;
and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or
law of the "fundamental" character that renders the entire
proceeding irregular and invalid.
The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude distinguishes Addonizio's claim from those in prior cases, upon
which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted.
Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, for example, like this
case, involved a claim that a judgment that was lawful when
it was entered should be set aside because of a later development. The subsequent development in that case, however,
was a change in the substantive law that established that the
conduct for which petitioner had been convicted and sentenced was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence
would surely have been a "complete miscarriage of justice"
since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful. The
change in Parole Commission policies involved in this case
is not of the same character: this change affected the way in
which the court's judgment and sentence would be performed
but it did not affect the lawfulness of the judgment itselfthen or now. Nor is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443,
analogous to the present case. In that case, the Court
10rdered resentencing of a defendant whose original sentence
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had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions
secured without the assistance of counsel. But the error
underlying the sentence in Tucker, as the Court emphasized,
was "misinformation of constitutional magnitude. " Id., at
447. We have held that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convictions serve as the basis for enhanced punishment. Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115. Whether or not the Parole Com..
mission action in this case was constitutional, a question not
presented here, there is no claim that the action taken by the
sentencing judge was unconstitutional, or was based on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude."
Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio's
claim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to
all of the objective criteria-federal jurisdiction, the Constitution, and federal law-the sentence was and is a lawful one.
And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the
grounds for collateral attack to include claims based not on
any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of
the subjective intent of the sentencing judge.
As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing
judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the
validity of his judgment. The record made when Judge Barlow
pronounced sentence against Addonizio, for example, is entirely consistent with the view that the Judge then thought
that this was an exceptional case in which the severity of
Addonizio's offense should and would be considered carefully
by the Parole Commission when Addonizio became eligible
for parole. If the record is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion
is not filed until years later, it will often be difficult to reconstruct with any certainty the subjective intent of the judge
at the time of sentencing. Regular attempts to do so may well
increase the risk of inconsistent treatment of defe11dants; on
the other hand, the implementation of the Parole Commis·sion's policies may reduce that risk.
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Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts
to engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the con~
trary, the proposed system of sentencing review would be
inconsistent with that established by Congress. The decision
as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be
released has been committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole Commission. 13 Whether
wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in
the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and
in doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges.14 The authority of sentencing judges
to select precise release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited:
the judge may select an early parole eligibility date, but that
guarantees only that the defendant will be considered at that
time by the Parole Commission. 15 And once a sentence has
A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of his maximum sentence less "good time" computed according to 18 U. S. C. § 4161.
In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than five years' imprisonment
is entitled to be released on parole after serving two-thirds of each consecutive term or 30 years, whichever is first, unless the Commission determines that the prisoner "has seriously or frequently violated institutional
rules" or that there is a reasonable probability that he would commit
further crimes. 18 U.S. C.§ 4206 (d). The Commission has substantial
discretion to determine whether a pri::mner should be released on parole,
once he is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by statute.
18 U. S. C. § 4203 (1970), in effect when Addonizio was sentenced,
provided:
"If it appears to the Board ... that there is a reasonable probability that
such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and
if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the
welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release
of such prisoner on parole."
Under the statute now in effect, 18 U. S. C. § 4206, the Commission is to
consider the risk of recidivism and whether "release would . . . depreciate
the seriousness of [the] offense or promote disrespect for the law."
14 See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., .1st Sess., Hl
' (1975).
15 The trial court may set a defendant's eligibility for parole at any
13
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been imposed, the trial judge's authority to modify it is also
circumscribed. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence
within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed
on appeal.' 0 The time period, however, is jurisdictional and
may not be extended. 17
The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has
no enforcible expectations with respect to the actual release
of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The
judge may well have expectations as to when release is likely.
But the actual decision is not his to make, either at the time
of sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To require the Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial
expectations, and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for
ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would subpoint up to one-third of the maximum sentence imposed, see 18 U. S. C.
§ 4205 (a), (b) (1976); 18 U. S. C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970). Whether the
defendant will actually br paroled at that time is the decision of the
Parole Commission. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 47 ("the
extent of a federal prisoner's confinement is initially determined by the
sentencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally
prescribed range; release on parole is then available on review by the
United States Parole Commission, which, as a general rule, may conditionally release a prisoner any time after he serves one-third of the judicially-fixed term."). The trial judge is precluded from effectively usurping
that function by splitting a lengthy sentence between a stated period of
probation and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a
sentence entailing incarceration of more than six months. 18 U. S. C.
§ 3651 (2) (1976).
16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such authority: "The beginning of the service of the sentence in a criminal case ends
the power of the court even in the same term to change it." United
States v. Murray , 275 U. S. 347, 358. This rule was applied even though
the change related only to the second of a pair of consecutive sentences
which itself was not being served at the time. Affronti v. United States,
'350 U. S. 79.
17 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45 (b) ; United States v. Robinson, 361
u. s. 220.

'
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stantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the Commision and not the courts.
Nothing in § 2255 supports-let alone mandates-such a
frustration of congressional intent.
Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the
validity of the Parole Commission's actions, either in promulgating its new guidelines or in denying Addonizio's applications for parole, we hold that subsequent actions taken by the
Parole Commission-whether or not such actions accord with
a trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing-do not
retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment itself.
The facts alleged by the prisoners in these cases do not provide a basis for a collateral attack on their respective sentences
pursuant to § 2255.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
reversed.

.,
'

-~,.

''

i

'

'/'
:1

John:
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

lfp/ss
'
''

i

·~ .~~~'

,.,,

.§~ ~t nf tift 'Jftnittb .;§tatts

JfasJrittgLm. ~. <!J. 2llgi~,;l
CHAMBERS OF

May 22, 1979

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

No. 78-156 - United States v. Addonizio

Dear John,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
erne

•.

.
.

.'

.:§ttprtnu

"Jttttrl vf tltt 'Jjtttittb .;itaf:tg

'J)t~Ulpttgton:. ~. QJ:

20gt'!$

CHAMB E R S OF

JU S TICE HARRY A . BLA C KMUN

Re:

May 23, 1979

78-156 - United States v. Addonizio

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

j/J;f.

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

.§u:pumt ('Jmtrlttf Urt ~~ ~hdt.tr
'JTa$Jri:ttgittn. ~. ~ 2llgt'! ~ '
CHAMBERS O•

May 231 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

78-156 - United States v. Addonizio

Dear John:
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

() ~ .
\

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies for the Conference

•

I

/.

~ttpTtlttt

<qo-mf o-f flrt ~b .:§ta.tt~
20p:)!. ~

2lfzurJrittghr.tt. lB. <!J.
CHAMBERS OF

/

May 25, 1979

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE: No. 78-156

United States v. Addonizio, et al.

Dear John:
Will you please mark at the foot of your opinion:
"Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the
decision of this case."

•
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

~ttpt"tltU

<lJou:ri of tlft ~tb _j~g

...aslfi:n:ghnt.1IJ. Clt· 21lgt'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

May 25, 1979

Re:

No. 78-156 - United States v. Addonizio

Dear John:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

/

«.o:

'!)fte lL ·,

~.

Uustice Jr,

I

l!l

Justice Ste~:'<rt
fir.. 1Ju,;t:l ~,.,e White

}Ar.

~\t
~~ \

14r .. TI'ul.i.J;1oe '!1 rs.bf.lll
~ua-t '~:l Bl :-=wl~mun

. urt"ice ?0~~;.,11
Kr. Justice B.•.~hf!QUiSt

lrom• lr. Justice Stevens
2nd DRAFT

?8' 79

.Jleo-iTOula-ted: - - ---·...........~._

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-156
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[June -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Three prisoners have alleged that a postsentencing change
in the policies of the United States Parole Commission has
prolonged their actual imprisonment beyond the period intended by the sentencing judge. The question presented is
whether this type of allegation will support a collateral attack
on the original selltence under 18 U. S. C. § 2255. 1 We hold
that it will not.

I
With respect to the legal issue presented, the claims before
28 U.S. C.§ 2255 provides:
"A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress claiming thf' right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of thf' Constitution or laws of the Unitf'd
StatE's, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,
or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
is otherwise subject. to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
1

"If the court finds that the judgm<>nt was rendered without jurisdiction,
or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open
to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of
the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court sha ll vacate and set the judgment aside
and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
or correct the sentence as may appea r appropriate."
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us are identical. To bring this issue into sharp focus, we
accept for purposes of decision Addonizio's . view of the facts
and the relevant aspects of the Parole Commission's practices.
After his conviction in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, on September 22, 1970,
Addonizio was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine
of $25,000. Factors which led the District Judge to impose
that sentence included the serious character of Addonizio's
offenses,2 and the Judge's expectation that exemplary instituAt the time he imposed sentence, Judge Barlow stated:
"Weighed against these virtues, [Mr. Addonizio's record of public service] ... is his conviction by a jury in this court of crimes of monumental
proportion, the enormity of which can scarcely be exaggerated and the
commission of which create the gravest implications for our form of
government.
"Mr. Addonizio, and the other defendants here, have been convicted of
one count of conspiring to extort and 63 substantive counts of extorting
hundreds of thousands of dollars from persons doing business with the City
of Newark. An intricate conspiracy of this magnitude, I suggest to you,
Mr. Hell ring [defense counsel], could have never succeeded without the
then-Mayor Addonizio's approval and participation.
"These were no ordinary criminal acts. . . . These crimes for which
Mr. Addonizio and the other defendants have been convicted represent a
pattern of continuous, highly-organized, systematic criminal extortion over
a period of many years, claiming many victims and touching many more
lives.
"Instances of corruption on the part of elected and appointed governmental officials are certainty not novel to the law, but the corruption disclosed here, it seems to the Court, is compounded by the frightening
alliance of criminal Plements and public officials, and it is this very kind
of totally destructive conspiracy that was conceived, organized and exe.
cuted by these defendants.
" ... It is impossible to estimate the impact upon-and the cost of-these
criminal acts to the decent citizens of Newark, and, indeed, to the citizens
of the State of New Jersey, in terms of their frustration, despair and
disillusionment.
2

"Their crimes, in the judgment of this Court, tear at the very heart of
· our civilized form of government and of our society. The people will not
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tional behavior would lead to Addonizio's release when he
became eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence.3 The judge did not contemplate that the Parole Commission might rely on the seriousness of the offense as a reason
for refusing a parole which Addonizio would otherwise receive.
In 1973 the Parole Commission markedly changed its
policies. 4 Under its new practices the gravity of the offense
became a significant factor in determining whether a prisoner should be granted parole. Addonizio became eligible
for parole on July 3, 1975. After hearings, the Parole COmtolerate such conduct at any level of government, and those who use their
public office to betray the public trust in this manner can expect from the
courts only the gravest consequences.
"It is, accordingly, the sentences of this Court that the defendant Hugh
J. Addonizio shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney General
of the United States for a term of ten years, and that, additionally, the
defendant Hugh J. Addonizio shall pay a fine of $25,000. That is all."
573 F. 2d, at 154.
sIn his opinion granting Addonizio relief under § 2255 in 1977, Judge
Barlow r,tated:
"At the time sentence was imposed, this Court expected that petitioner
would receive a meaningful parole hearing-that is, a determination based
on his institutional record and the likelihood of recidivism-upon the completion of one-third (Y:J) of his sentence. The Court anticipated-assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined-that petitioner would be actually confined for a period of approximately three and one-half to four years of the ten-year sentence, in view of
the fact that he was a first-offender and that there appeared to be little
probability of recidivism, given the circumstances of the case and his personal and social history. This sentencing expectation was based on the
Court's understanding-which was consistent with generally-held notionsof the operation of the parole system in 1970." Pet. for Cert. 28a~29a.
4 The Commission commenced using guidelines on a trial basis in 1972
and started to apply them throughout the nation in November 1973. See
38 Fed. Reg. 31942. The Commission's present guidelines are codified at
28 CFR § 2.20. The use of guidelines iR now required by statute. See
l8 U.S. C.§§ 4203 (a) (1) and ·1206 (a).
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mission twice refused to release him, expressly basing its
refusal on the serious character of his crimes. 5
Thereafter, Addonizio invoked the District Court's jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 and moved for resentencing.
Following the Third Circuit's decision in United States v.
Salerno, 538 F. 2d 1005, 1007 (1976), the District Court accepted jurisdiction, found that the Parole Commission had
not given Addonizio the kind of "meaningful parole hearing"
that the judge had anticipated when sentence was imposed,
and reduced his sentence to the time already served. The
judge stated that he had "anticipated-assuming an appropriate institutional adjustment and good behavior while confined-that [Addonizio] would be actually confined for a
5 As Judge Aldisert noted in his opinion for the Third Circuit, the comments made by the Parole Commission on January 13, 1977, explaining
its denial of parole are remarkably similar to the reasons given by the trial
judge at the time sentence was imposed. The Commission stated:
"Your offense behavior has been rated· as very high severity. Your silent
factor score is 11. You have been in custody a total of 57 months at time
of hearing. Guidelines established oy the Commission for adult cases
which consider the above factors suggest a range of 25-36 months to be
served before release Jor cases with good institutional adjustment. After
careful consideration of all relevant factors and information presented, a
decision above the guidelines appears warranted because your offense was
part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy lasting from 1965 to 1968, which
consisted of many separate offenses committed by you and approximately
14 other co-conspirators. As the highest elected official in the City of
Newark, you were convicted of an extortion conspiracy in which, under
color of your official authority, you and your co-conspirators conspired to
delay, impede, obstruct, and otherwise thwart construction in the City
of Newark in order to obtain a percentage of contracts for the privilege of
working on city construction projects.
"Because of the magnitude of this crime (money extorted totalling approximately $241,000) its economic effect on innocent citizens of Newark, and
because the offense involved a serious breach of public trust over a substantial period of time, a decision above the guidelines is warranted.
Parole at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and
r>romote disrespect for the law." 573 F. 2d, at 153-154.

·"
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period of approximately three and one-half to four years of
the ten-year sentence." This "sentencing expectation" was
frustrated by the Parole Commission's subsequent adoption of
new standards and procedures.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 573 F. 2d 147. Because
of a conflict with the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding
that § 2255 does not give district courts this type of resentencing authority, 6 we granted the Government's petition for certiorari in Addonizio's case and in the consolidated case of
two other prisoners in which similar relief was granted. 7

II
We decide only the jurisdictional issue. We do not consider
the Government's alternative argument that the significance
of the changes in the Parole Commission's procedures has been
exaggerated because it always attached some weight to the
character of the offense in processing parole applications.
Nor do we have any occasion to consider whether the new
guidelines are consistent with the Parole Commission and
6 Bonanno v. United States, Civ. No.- (CA9 1978), cert. granted,U. S . - (Dec. 11, 1978), cert. dismissed pursuant to Rule 60,- U.S.
(Feb. 1, 1979).
7 In United States v. Whelan & Flaherty, two federal prisoners filed
motions under §§ 2241 and 2255 challenging their confinement. The § 2241
motion was denied by the District Court; the Court of Appeals affirmed,
573 F. 2d 147, and Whelan and Flaherty did not seek further review. In
the § 2255 motion, which is at issue here, the respondents claimed that
the Parole Commission's action frustrated the intent of Judge Shaw, who
had originally sentenced them and who had since died. The case was
assigned to Judge Biunno, who took the position that "the real issue is
whether the Parole Commission's denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious," Pet. App., at 35a, and concluded that it was not. The Court of
Appeals vacated that decision and directed Judge Biunno to reconsider the
case to determine whether Judge Shaw's sentencing intent had been frustrated. Proceedings on remand have resulted in the release of both
respondents.

'!
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Reorganization Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 219; 8 or whether their )
enforcement may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. 0

III
When Congress enacted § 2255 in 1948, it simplified the procedure for making a collateral attack on a final judgment
entered in a federal criminal case, but it did not purport to
modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral review. It has, of course, long been settled law that
an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not
necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. 10
The reasons for narrowly limiting the grounds for collateral
attack on final judgments are well known and basic to our
adversary system of justice. 11 The question in this case is
whether an error has occurred that is sufficiently fundamental
to come within those narrow limits.
Under § 2255, the sentencing court is authorized to discharge or resentence a defendant if it concludes that it "was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the
See Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 579 F. 2d 238 (CA3
1978).
0 See Rodriguez v. United States Pamle Commission and Metropolitan
Center, slip op. No. 78-2051 (CA7 Mar. 20, 1979).
10 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 274 ("Of
course the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal. ...
This rule must be strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be
maintained."); Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 181-182; Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424.
11 Inroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the
integrity of our procedurrs. Ser, e. g., F. James, Civil Procedure 517- j
518 ( 1965). Moreover. incrra~ed volume of judicial work associated
with the processing of collateral !Lttacks inevitably impairs and delays the
orderly administration of justice. Because there is no limit on the time
when a collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearing:; are oft('n inconclusive and retrials may be impo:SSible if the attack is succe sful. See
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 49l n. 31; Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S.
145, 154 n. 13,
8
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sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." This statute was
intended to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions
filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by
providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. United States v. Hay~
man, 342 U. S. 205, 216-217.
While the remedy is in this sense comprehensive, it does
not encompass all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.
Habeas corpus has long been available to attack convictions
and sentences entered by a court without jurisdiction. See,
e. g. , Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 202-203 (MARSHALL, C.
J.). In later years, the availability of the writ was expanded
to encompass claims of constitutional error as well. See
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 , 104-105; Brown v. Allen,
344 U. S. 443. But unless the claim alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error, the scope of collateral attack
has remained far more limited. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S.
465, 477 n. 10. The Court has held that an error of law
does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed
error constituted "a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." Hill v. United
States, 368 U. S. 424, 428.
Similar limitations apply with respect to claimed errors of
fact. The justification for raising such errors in a § 2255proceeding, as amicus here points out/ 2 is that traditionally
they could have been raised by a petition for a writ of coram
nobis, and thus fall within § 2255's provision for vacating sentences that are "otherwise subject to collateral attack." But
coram nobis jurisdiction has never encompassed all errors of
fact; instead, it was of a limited scope, existing "in those
cases where the errors were of the most fundamental character, that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular·
and invalid." United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 69.
l

2

See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lewi::;burg Prison Project, at 10-12.

78-156-0PINION

8
\

UNITED STATES v. ADDONIZIO

Thus, the writ of coram nobis was "available to bring before
thE' court that pronounced the juclgmcnt E'nors in matters
of fact which had not been put in issue or passed upon, and
were material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself; as where the defendant, being under age, appeared by an attorney, or the plaintiff or defendant was a
married woman at the time of commencing the suit, or dies
before verdict of interlocutory judgment." !d., at 68.
The claimed error here-that the judge was incorrect iri
his assumptions about the future course of parole proceedings-does not meet any of the established standards of
collateral attack. There is no claih1 of a constitutional viola-"
tion; the sentence imposed was within the statutory limits;
and the proceeding was not infected with any error of fact or
law of the "fundamental" character that renders the entire
proceeding irregular and invalid;
The absence of any error of this nature or magnitude distinguishes Addonizio's claim from tfiose in prior cases, upon
which he relies, in which collateral attacks were permitted,
Davis v. United States, 4'17 U. S. 333, for example, like this
case, involved a claim that a judgment that was lawful whe1i
it was entered should be set aside because of a later development. The subsequent development . in that case, however,
was a change in the substantive law. that established that th~
conduct for which petitioner had b.een convicted and sentenced was lawful. To have refused to vacate his sentence
would surely have been a "complete miScarriage of justice"
since the conviction and sentence were no longer lawful. · The
change in Parole Commission policies involved in this case
is not of the same character: t}1is change affected the way in
which the court's judgment and sentence would be performed
but it did not affect the lawfulness of th.e judgment itselfthen or now. Nor is United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443,
analog<;JUs to the present case.. In that case, the Court
ordered resentencing of a defen'clant whose original sentence
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had been imposed at least in part upon the basis of convictions
secured without the assistance of counsel. But the error
underlying the sentence in Tucker, as the Court emphasized,
was "misinformation of constitutional magnitude." I d., at
447. We have held that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is itself violated when uncounseled convictions serve as the basis for enhanced punishment. Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 115. Whether or not the Parole Commission action in this case was constitutional, a question not
presented here, there is no claim that the action taken by the
seutencing judge was unconstitutional, or was based on "misinformation of constitutional magnitude."
Our prior decisions, then, provide no support for Addonizio's
daim that he is entitled to relief under § 2255. According to
all of the objective criteria-federal jurisdiction, the Constitution, and federal law-the sentence was and is a lawful one.
And in our judgment, there is no basis for enlarging the
grounds for collateral a.ttack to include claims based not on
any objectively ascertainable error but on the frustration of
the subjective intent of the sentencing judge.
As a practical matter, the subjective intent of the sentencing
judge would provide a questionable basis for testing the
validity of his judgment. The record made when Judge Barlow
pronounced sentence against Addonizio, for example, is entirely consistent with the view that the Judge then thought
that this was an exceptional case in which the severity of
Addonizio's offense should and would be considered carefully
by the Parole Commission when Addonizio became eligible
for parole. If the record is ambiguous, and if a § 2255 motion
is not filed until years later, it will often be difficult to reconstruct with any certainty the subjective intent of the judge
at the time of sentencing. Regular attempts to do so may well
increase the risk of inconsistent treatment of defendants; orr
the other hand, the implementation of the Parole Commission's policies may reduce that risk.
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Nothing in the statutory scheme directs sentencing courts
to engage in this task on collateral attack; quite to the contrary, the proposed system of sentencing review would be
inconsistent with that established by Congress. The decision
as to when a lawfully sentenced defendant shall actually be
released has been committed by Congress, with certain limitations, to the discretion of the Parole Commission. 13 Whether
wisely or not, Congress has decided that the Commission is in
the best position to determine when release is appropriate, and
in doing so, to moderate the disparities in the sentencing practices of individual judges. 14 The authority of sentencing judges
to select precise release dates is, by contrast, narrowly limited:
the judge may select an early parole eligibility date, but that
guarantees only that the defendant will be considered at that
time by the Parole Commission. 15 And once a sentence has
A federal prisoner is entitled to release at the expiration of his maximum sentence less "good time" computed according to 18 U. S. C. § 4161.
In addition, any prisoner sentenced to more than five years' imprisonment
is entitled to be released on parole after serving two-thirds of each consecutive term or 30 years, whichever is first, unless the Commission determines that the prisoner "has seriously or frequently violated institutional
rules" or that there is a reasonable probability that he would commit
further crimes. 18 U.S. C.§ 4206 (d). The Commission has substantial
discretion to determine whether a. prisoner should be released on parole,
once he is eligible, prior to the point where release is mandated by statute.
18 U. S. C. § 4203 (1970), in effect when Addonizio was sentenced,
provided :
"If it appears to the Board ... that there is a reasonable probability that
such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and
if in the opinion of the Board such releasP is not incompatible with the
welfare of society, the Board m1ty in itA discretion authorize the release
of such prisoner on parole."
Under the statute now in effect, 18 U. S. C. § 4206, the Commission is to
consider the risk of recidivism and whethPr "release would ... dPpreciate
the seriousnPss of [the] offen~e or promote disrespect for the law."
tJ See generally S. Conf. Rep. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 16
13

~1975).
~5

The trial court may set a defendant's ehgibility for parole at any
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been imposed, the trial ,judge's authority to modify it is also
circumscribed. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure now authorizes District Courts to reduce a sentence
within 120 days after it is imposed or after it has been affirmed
on appeal. 16 The time period, however, is jurisdictional and
may not be extended. 17
The import of this statutory scheme is clear: the judge has
no enforcible expectations with respect to the actual release
of a sentenced defendant short of his statutory term. The
judge may well have expectations as to when release is likely.
But the actual decision is not his to make, either at the time
of sentencing or later if his expectations are not met. To require the Parole Commission to act in accordance with judicial
expectations, and to use collateral attack as a mechanism for
ensuring that these expectations are carried out, would subpoint up to one-third of the maximum sentrnce imposed, see 18 U. S. C.
§ 4205 (a), (b) (1976); 18 U. S. C. §§ 4202, 4208 (1970). Whether the
defendant will actually be paroled at that timr is the decision of the
Parole Commission. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 47 ("the
extent of a federal prisoner's confinement i~; initially determined by the
.;entencing judge, who selects a term within an often broad, congressionally
prescribed ran~e; release on parole iH then available on review by the
United Statr · Parole Commi"sion, which, as a grneral rule, may conditionally release a prisoner any time after he serves one-third of the judicially-fixed term."). The trial judgr is precluded from effectively usurping
that function by splitting a lengthy sentencP between a stated prriod of
probation and imprisonment: probation may not be combined with a
sentence entailing incarceration of more than six months . 18 U. S. C.
§ 3651 (2) (1976).
16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 35, the trial courts had no such authority: "The be~mning of the srrvice of the srntence in a criminal case end~;
the power of the court even in the sanw term to change it ." Uuited
States v. Murray , 275 U. S. 347, 358. This rule was applied even though
the change related only to the second of a pair of consecutive sentrnces
wl11eh itself wa<> not being served at the time. Aff1'onU v. United States,
350 U. S. 79.
17 See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc . 45 (b) , United States v. Robin.son, 361
U. S. 220
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stantially undermine the congressional decision to entrust release determinations to the Commision and not the courts.
Nothing in § 2255 supports-let alone mandates-such a
frustration of congressional iutent.
Accordingly, without reaching any question as to the
validity of the Parole Commission's actions, either in promulgating its new guidelines or in denying Addonizio's applications for parole, we hold that subsequent actions taken by the
Parole Commission-whether or not such actions accord with
a trial judge's expectations at the time of sentencing-do not
retroactively affect the validity of the final judgment itself.
The facts alleged by the prisoners in these cases do not provide a basis for a collateral attack on their respective sentences
pursuant to ~ 2255.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are therefore
reversed.
MR. JFS'l'ICE BRENNAN took no part in the decision of this
case.
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